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1.  Introduction 
The contextual background to this paper book is the division of Hindu society in India into a 
number of caste groups.  The caste system in India stratifies Hindus, who constitute 80% of India's 
population, into mutually exclusive caste groups, membership of which is determined entirely by 
birth.  Very broadly, one can think of four subgroups: brahmins; kshatriyas; vaisyas; and sudras.1  
Brahmins, who were traditionally priests and teachers, represent the highest caste; Kshatriyas 
(traditionally, warriors and rulers) and Vaisyas (traditionally, moneylenders and traders) are ‘high 
caste’ (or equivalently, ‘forward’ or ‘upper’ caste or, as they are sometimes termed, ‘twice born’) 
Hindus; 2 the Sudras (traditionally performing menial jobs) constitute the ‘other backward classes’ 
(OBC). 3  Then there are those persons (mostly Hindu, but some who have converted to Buddhism or 
Christianity) whom Hindus belonging to the four caste groups (listed above) regard as being outside 
the caste system because they are ‘untouchable’ in the sense that physical contact with them - most 
usually the acceptance of food or water - is polluting or unclean.4  Articles 341 and 342 of the Indian 
constitution include a list of castes entitled to special benefits and all those groups included in this list 
– and subsequent modifications to this list – are referred to as, respectively, ‘Scheduled Castes’.   The 
term ‘Scheduled Castes’ (hereafter abbreviated to SC) is, for all practical purposes, synonymous with 
the former ‘untouchable’ castes.  Persons from the SC are often also referred to as Dalits (meaning 
‘broken’ or ‘oppressed’). 
Exacerbating the social ostracism of the SC is the fact that they are among the poorest and 
most backward of India's population.   A combination of social ostracism and extreme poverty means 
that many persons from the SC, particularly in rural India, live in circumstances which are both 
physically harsh and psychologically humiliating and in which they are denied even the most basic 
 
1
 These four castes are said to have come from Brahma's mouth (brahmin), arms (kshatriya), thighs (bania) and 
feet (sudra). This is termed the Purusasukta legend which appears in an appendix to the Rig Veda. 
2
 However, confusingly, vaisyas are ‘forward’ in some states (Uttar Pradesh) but ‘backward’ in others (Bihar). 
3
 The term “other” signifies “in addition to those who are ‘outcastes’'' (see below).  There is an important 
distinction within the OBC between those who are just ‘backward’ (Yadavs, Kurmis, Lodh, many members of 
these sub-castes being traditional land-owners), those who are ‘more backward’ castes’, and those whose are 
‘most backward' (Saini, Prajapati, Pal, whose degree of dispossession bears comparison to that of the 
‘untouchable' group). 
4
 Stemming largely from the fact that, in occupational terms, they performed – and continue to perform - the 
dirtiest and lowliest of tasks: burials and disposal of carcasses; scavenging; the removal of excreta. 
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human rights. For example, they are routinely: denied access to wells used by caste Hindus; 
prohibited from entering Hindu temples and from participating in village festivals; forced to live in 
settlements segregated from the main village, located in its most insalubrious outskirts. They are 
almost always landless and have to eke out a living either as wage or bonded labourers to caste Hindu 
masters, or by performing menial services like scavenging and disposing of human and animal 
carcasses.5 Overlaying the oppressive nature of the circumstances in which many Dalits in India live, 
is the constant threat of violence from caste Hindus.   Much of this violence is visited upon Dalit 
women.  The upper-caste practice of raping Dalit women or parading them naked through a village if 
they are seen as “getting above themselves” is fairly commonplace (Sainath, 2002).   
  However, deprivation and destitution are not the sole prerogative of the SC.  There is an 
important distinction within the OBC between those who are ‘backward’ (Yadavs, Kurmis, Lodh, 
many members of these sub-castes being traditional land-owners), and those who are most 
‘backward'.  The degree of dispossession of the last group (Saini, Prajapati, Pal) bears comparison to 
that of the SC though, of course, they do not have the stigma of ‘untouchability’ imposed on the SC.  
 Against this background, there are several reasons for tension between castes in Indian 
villages. Sometimes this tension stems from the untouchability issue and manifests itself in disputes 
between the ‘upper castes’ and the SC over the use of common property resources like water and 
grazing land6 and sometimes over the ownership of land.7  Another source of friction is resentment by 
the SC at the refusal to them, by the upper castes, of certain types of employment which violate 
pollution norms (like domestic work, particularly involving cooking and handling food). Sometimes 
inter-caste tension is between the OBC - and particularly, its most backward component – and the SC.  
This derives from the fact that the both groups live at the margins of economic life and compete for 
scarce resources.  It also derives from the fact that the most backward classes are jealous of their non-
 
5
 See Borooah (2005) for measures of the deprivation of the SC and see inter alia Gupta (2000) for details of the 
Indian caste system. 
6
 For example the Guardian newspaper reported how a teen aged SC boy was killed by upper caste men when 
one of his goats strayed on to land to which they claimed possession (“Lynching of boy illustrates how  the 
curse of caste still blights India”, 19 October 2014). 
7
 For example, the Hindustan Times newspaper reported that four persons from the SC had been killed in 
Rajasthan when Jats (a dominant caste) had used tractors to flatten SC homes over a land dispute. (Dalits killed 
in dispute over land, 17 May 2015 ) 
3 
 
polluting status vis-a-vis the SC and are keen on demonstrating their ‘superior’ status by distancing 
themselves socially from the SC, particularly in relation to marriage.  It is no accident that some of the 
most egregious instances of caste violence in India have been prompted by SC men eloping with non-
SC women.8   
  As a result of these factors one of the features of contemporary Indian life, particularly in 
rural areas where a person’s caste identity is known to all, is ‘caste-based conflict’: this often, takes 
the form of conflict between the SC, on the one hand, and the upper castes or the OBC, on the other.9  
Irrespective of the location of the caste-based conflict, its basic characteristics are the same:  “whether 
caste clashes are social, economic, or political in nature, they are premised on the same basic principle 
[namely] any attempt to alter village customs or to demand land, increased wages, or political rights 
leads to violence and economic retaliation on the part of those most threatened by changes in the 
status quo.” (Narula, 1999, p. 29-30). As Ram (2004) and Jodhka (2004) show, violence against the 
SC is an all-India phenomenon. 
The genesis of – and, as we will show in this paper, the rise in – caste-related conflicts is best 
encapsulated by the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes: “whenever the 
SC have tried to organise themselves or assert their rights, there has been a backlash from the feudal 
lords resulting in mass killings, gang rapes, looting and arsoning, etc. of SC hamlets.”10 As discussed 
in some detail later in this paper, there has been a rise in the assertiveness of persons belonging to 
India’s lower castes, particularly the SC, large swathes of whom are no longer prepared to accept the 
subservient role that upper caste Hindus expect them to play and the polluting stigma that all Hindus 
 
8
 In November 2012, 268 houses belonging to SC persons were burnt down in Dharamupuri in the state of Tamil 
Nadu when a SC boy eloped with a Vanniyar  (most BC) girl.  
9
 Sushmita (2014) writes that between 1976 and 2001, around 700 Dalits and backward caste people were killed 
in the state of Bihar by upper caste private armies and police. In an infamous incident in June 2012, the Turu 
Kapus (OBC) – including women and children - attacked the Mala (Dalits) in the village of Laxmipet, in 
Srikakulum district in Andhra Pradesh, killing four and seriously injuring several dozen (Hyderabad Political 
Economy Group, 2012).  In Orissa, as Padhi et. al. (2012) report, violent incidents against Dalits occurs almost 
daily: most notably, on 22 January 2012, an entire Dalit hamlet comprising 45 families was burnt down in the 
village of Lathore; in February 2012, 22 Dalit families were burnt out of their homes in the village of 
Kamadhenukote; and in April 2012, a similar fate visited Dalit families in the village of Kalahandipada.  
Infamous acts of violence against Dalits have inter alia also occurred in Tamil Nadu (Senthalir, 2012); in 
Karnataka (Pinto, 1994); and in Haryana (EPW, 2010). 
10
 National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Highlights of the Report of the National 
Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the Years 1994-95 & 1995-96 (New Delhi: 
Government of India, 1997), p. 2. 
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assign to them. This rise in assertiveness has been aided by a growing realisation on the part of the 
lower castes that, through sheer numbers, they could, through appropriate political organisation, wield 
political power. To a significant extent they have succeeded in establishing powerful political parties 
which cater exclusively to their interests.    
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to provide a quantitative assessment of 
caste-based conflict in India. The data for this paper is from the Rural Economic and Demographic 
Survey (REDS) of 2006 encompassing 8,659 households in 242 villages in 18 Indian states.  This 
survey, as it pertains to conflict and conflict resolution is described in some detail in the next section.  
Using these data, we examine two broad issues 
1. The sources of conflict in rural India and the degree to which these sources contribute to 
caste-basted, as opposed to non-caste-based conflict. 
2. The sources of conflict resolution in rural India: are some conflict-resolving agencies more 
effective at dealing with caste-based conflicts and others more effective with non-caste-based 
conflicts?   
 
The next section describes the data used and the subsequent sections proceed to answering each of 
these questions.  
2.  The Rural Economic and Demography Survey of 2006 
The data for this paper is from the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) of 2006 
covering 18 states in India and encompassing 8,659 households in 242 villages in 18 Indian states and 
is described in Nagarajan et. al. (2015), chapter 5.  The households were asked a number of questions 
relating to their economic and social characteristics (employment, occupation, land ownership, social 
and religious groupings) but also about issues relating to governance, voting, and – relevant for this 
paper - conflict. 
Under the ‘conflict questionnaire’, heads of households (or their representative) in the villages 
were asked, against each of 11 proximate causes (detailed in Table 1), whether they had observed 
‘conflict’ in their village.  This questionnaire asked households to record conflicts that they had 
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observed by three time periods: the period of the current panchayat [village assembly or legislature]; 
the period of the previous panchayat; and the period of the previous to previous panchayat.  Since the 
panchayat periods are not specifically defined, we assumed that they were of five years duration so 
that the current panchayat period refers to (approximately) 2001-2006 and the previous panchayat 
period refers to (approximately) 1996-2001, and the previous to previous period refers to 
approximately 1991-1995.  Hereafter, these are referred to, respectively, as the ‘current’, the 
‘previous’, and ‘previous to previous’ periods.  The questionnaire administered to households, in 
respect of conflict observation, is reproduced below for the current panchayat period: identical 
questions were asked with respect to the other periods.  
Table 1: the Household Questionnaire 
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8 Dacoities         
9 Naxalite 
(Maoist) 
        
10 Large 
farmer & 
small 
farmer 
        
11 Farmer & 
worker 
        
*Role in conflict: Participant; Observer; Victim; Mediator; Arbitrator 
 The responses to the question in column 4 of Table 1 indicated that a total (over all the 
villages sampled) of: 19,997 conflicts were observed (by household heads) during the period of the 
current panchayat; 19,225 conflicts were observed during the previous panchayat; and 14,082 
conflicts were observed during the previous to previous panchayat.   
Table 2 tabulates the observed conflicts in Indian villages by the proximate cause of the 
conflict and by the three periods – those of the current panchayat, the previous panchayat, and the 
previous to previous panchayat – in which they occurred.  Of the conflicts observed during the period 
of the current panchayat, 33% was the result of inter-family disputes, nearly 20% was the result of 
disputes over the sharing of drinking water, 15% was the consequence of political disputes, and 10% 
was the result of labour disputes over wage payments. Thus, of the 11 proximate causes of disputes 
listed in Table 2, these four causes accounted for 78% of the observed disputes in the current period 
with the corresponding proportions being 79% and 80%, respectively, for the previous and previous to 
previous panchayats. 
Table 2: Observed Conflicts in Indian Villages by Proximate Cause of Conflict 
 Current Panchayat Previous Panchayat Previous to Previous Panchayat 
 Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total 
Labour conflicts (wage payments) 2,265 11.3 1,946        10.1 1,403 10.0 
Sharing Drinking Water 3,830 19.2 3,431 17.9 2448 17.4 
Sharing Irrigation Water 1,537 7.7 1,291 6.7 624.0 4.4 
Rent Collection from share croppers 750 3.8 905 4.7 679 4.8 
Encroachment on public land 866 4.3 909 4.7 697.0 5.0 
Inter-family disputes 6,755 33.8 6,623 34.5 5,663 40.2 
Political disputes 3,035 15.2 3,137 16.3 1792.0 12.7 
Dacoities (Banditry) 111 0.6 176 0.9 68 0.5 
Maoist Insurgencies 186 0.9 201 1.1 170.0 1.2 
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Large versus small farmer 196 1.0 199 1.0 170 1.2 
Farmer versus worker 466 2.3 407 2.1 368 2.6 
Total 19,997 100.0 19,225 100.0 14,082 100.0 
 
It is important to point out that the household questionnaire did not ask a household to record 
its experience of a particular type of conflict, simply whether it had been observed. So, for example, 
one household might have observed labour conflicts on a regular basis, while another observed such a 
conflict as an isolated incident; however, both households could only record that they had observed 
such a conflict without being able to detail their respective experiences.   
Lastly, it should be noted that a given household could observe more than one source of 
conflict: for example, household X could observe a conflict due to labour issues and another conflict 
relating to sharing drinking water. Consequently, the total number of observations could (and, 
generally, would) exceed the number of households recording these observations: in 2006, the 19,997 
observations of conflict emanated from 8,112 households for an average of 2.47 observations per 
household of conflict (from different sources). 
3. Caste-Based Conflict 
Households, who had observed a conflict in the village, stemming from one or the other of the 
11 sources of conflict listed in Table 1, were asked in column 5 of the ‘conflict questionnaire’ 
(reproduced in Table 1), if in their view it was ‘caste-based’ or ‘religion-based’: of the total of 19,997 
conflicts observed in 2006, 2,455 (12%) were judged to be ‘caste-based’ and 537 (3%) were judged to 
be ‘religion-based’.  While both dimensions relate to identity-based conflict, we focus on caste-based 
conflict because that is the more predominant phenomenon in rural India.11  
Table 3 shows that 2,455 of the total of 19,997 conflicts recorded in the current panchayat 
period (12%) were judged to be caste based, the corresponding proportions being 11% for the 
previous and the previous to previous panchayats (respectively, 2,107 out of 19,225 and 1,542 out of 
14,082 conflicts).  Table 3 also tabulates the proximate cause of caste based disputes. Now, the four 
main sources of conflict – labour, drinking water, inter-family, and political – accounted for 84% of 
 
11
 Religious based conflict in India, predominantly between Hindus and Muslims, is an urban, rather than rural 
phenomenon mainly because most of India’s Muslims are urban residents (see Varshney, 2002). 
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caste-based disputes in the current panchayat period, the corresponding proportions being 82% and 
83%, respectively, for the previous and previous to previous panchayats. 
Table 3: Caste-Based Conflicts in Indian Villages, by Proximate Cause of Conflict 
 Current Panchayat Previous Panchayat Previous to Previous Panchayat 
 Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total 
Labour conflicts (wage payments) 331 13.5 266 12.6 203 13.2 
Sharing Drinking Water 550 22.4 382 18.1 321 20.8 
Sharing Irrigation Water 159 6.5 110 5.2 51 3.3 
Rent Collection from share croppers 87 3.5 109 5.2 77 5.0 
Encroachment on public land 76 3.1 67 3.2 84 5.5 
Inter-family disputes 712 29.0 625 29.7 571 37.0 
Political disputes 471 19.2 452 21.5 179 11.6 
Dacoities (Banditry) 19 0.8 21 1.0 7 0.5 
Maoist Insurgencies 0 0.0 3 0.1 4 0.3 
Large versus small farmer 20 0.8 13 0.6 9 0.6 
Farmer versus worker 30 1.2 59 2.8 36 2.3 
Total 2,455 100.0 2,107 100.0 1,542 100.0 
 
Figure 1 shows, for each the four main roots of caste-based conflict – namely, labour, 
drinking water, inter-family, and political which, as noted earlier accounted for nearly 80% of all 
conflicts - the proportion of total conflicts that were caste-based for, respectively, the periods of the 
current, previous, and previous to previous panchayats.  In the current period, for example, 14.7% of 
labour conflicts, 14.4 % of drinking water based conflicts, 10.6% of inter-family conflicts, and 16.6% 
of political conflicts were caste-based. 
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Figure 1: Caste-Based Conflicts as a Percentage of Total Conflicts  
 
 Figure 1 also clearly shows that the proportion of caste-based disputes, in the four sources of 
conflict, was higher in the period of the present panchayat – particularly with respect to political 
conflict – than in previous panchayats.  
Attitudes to Caste through Vignettes 
 REDS was also able to explore the opinions of persons with respect to caste-related issues by 
seeking views about the salience of caste in different situations.  We detail two situations below: the 
first relating to attitudes towards low caste, and the second relating to attitudes towards high caste, 
persons 
Question 1: How easy is it for Rajmohan [a low caste person] to attend public and religious 
ceremonies in the village without attracting [adverse] attention to himself because of his caste? 
Question 2: How easy is it for Krishnan [a Brahmin] to interact with people from other castes in the 
village? 
Figure 2 shows the responses to these two questions in terms of the following categories: very easy; 
easy; moderately easy; slightly easy; impossible. 
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Figure 2: Responses to Questions 1 (Rajmohan) and 2 (Krishnan)* (%) 
 
* 25,862 responses 
 The distribution of responses between the two questions was very similar. About 7% thought 
that it would be impossible for a lower caste person not to attract attention to himself at a public 
religious ceremony while 7% also thought that a Brahmin would find it impossible to interact with 
other castes in the village. In total about one in four respondents felt there would be some degree of 
difficulty on both accounts. 
The root of the problem regarding the discomfort that lower and upper caste persons feel in 
each other’s presence, as exemplified in the vignettes about Rajmohan and Krishnan, lies in the 
custom and practice of ‘untouchability’ according to which a lower caste person was ‘unclean’ and 
that, therefore, physical contact with such a person was polluting.  After Independence, the Indian 
Constitution abolished ‘untouchability’ and made its practice an offence.  This prohibition was 
strengthened by the Protection of Civil Rights Acts of 1955 and 1976 and the Prevention of Atrocities 
Acts of 1989 and 1995.  Under the Protection of Civil Rights Acts of 1955 and 1976 many anti-Dalit 
actions became offences. These included inter alia: prohibiting entry into places of worship; denial of 
access to water; denial of access to public places; denial of goods and/or services.  Yet, 
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notwithstanding these laws, it is untouchability more than anything else that is responsible for the 
denial of human rights to lower caste persons (Sainath , 2002). 
  An area of exclusion – which was underpinned by the gamut of issues associated with 
pollution and untouchability - was the Mid-day meal scheme which provided free lunch on school 
days for children in Primary and Upper Primary Classes in Government schools.  Discrimination in 
mid-day meals took several forms: not serving them adequate amounts, making them wait till high 
caste children have finished their meal, throwing food into their plates so as to avoid any possibility of 
physical contact, seating them separately from higher caste children with separately marked plates, 
and not appointing any persons from the Scheduled Castes as cooks and helpers (Nambissan, 2010; 
Thorat and Lee, 2010).   
Another area of contention associated with untouchability was water.  In most schools in 
Rajasthan, children from the higher caste drank water and washed their plates before children from 
the lower castes and one school had separate water pitchers for SC pupils.  The pattern of SC pupils 
having to wait their turn was repeated in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.  Furthermore, in Madhya 
Pradesh, only children from the higher castes were allowed to fetch water for the teachers and guests 
(Ramachandran and Naorem , 2013).  Bros and Couttenier (2010) show that caste norms which 
prohibit the sharing of water between upper castes and Dalits are still vigorous and violently enforced 
while Tiwary (2006) argues that since 75% of Dalit households in rural areas depend on community 
sources (see Table 4), they are more subject to discrimination (such as, separate queues, extra waiting 
time, other’s filling the buckets, etc.) and different forms of the practice of untouchability. 
Table 4: The Access of Rural Households to Water 
Caste Exclusive Use (%) Community Use (%) Common Use (%) 
Dalits 18 75 7 
Other Backward Classes 27 64 10 
Upper Castes 36 54 10 
Source: Tiwary (2006), p. 102. 
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‘Untouchable’ casual labourers find it difficult to obtain many types of employment in the 
farm and non-farm sectors for example, jobs involving the harvesting of fruit and vegetables.  Sellers 
from the SC of edible products - like milk, fruit, vegetables, and cooked food - find it difficult to find 
buyers.  Thorat and Lee (2010) pointed out that there were also disparities in treatment with respect to 
the Public Distribution System (PDS) for food: it transpired that most of the government approved 
agents who ran PDS shops were from the higher castes and they offered preferential service to their 
own caste members. 
4. Conflict Resolution 
The household questionnaire also asked about conflict resolution and the ‘conflict resolution 
questions’ are set out for the current panchayat in Table 5. Identical questions were asked about the 
previous and previous to previous panchayats. 
Table 5: Household Questionnaire on Conflict Resolution  
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11 1 Farmer & worker     
Codes for Agency of Conflict Resolution 1=Court; 2=Traditional Panchayats;  3=Elected Panchayats;  4=Village headman;  5=Wealthy 
individual;  6=Other important village individual; 7=Tehsildar;  8=Magistrate;  9=Village government official; 10=Relatives; 11=Police 
 
Most of the conflicts reported in the REDS had been resolved at the time the survey was 
conducted: the ‘resolution rate’ (RR) over all conflicts and over all time periods (current, previous, 
and previous to previous panchayats) was 84.6%.  However, as Figure 3 shows, the RR varied 
according to the type of conflict (caste-based and non-caste-based) and the time period (current, 
previous, and previous to previous panchayats).  For all three periods, the RR of caste-based conflicts 
was lower than that of non-caste-based conflicts and, for the current panchayat, at 69% to 84%, it was 
15 pp lower. The RR declined for both types of conflict as one moved from the period furthest in time 
(the previous to previous panchayat period) to the present period but this probably reflected the 
healing effects of time. 
Figure 3: Conflict Resolution Rate (%) by Type of Conflict and Time Period* 
*Percentage of conflicts resolved by time of survey. 
The REDS data listed 11 agents (listed in the note to Table 5) who were instrumental in 
resolving conflicts and from these we aggregated four main agents who, over all the periods, were 
responsible for resolving 97% of the resolved conflicts: 
1. Resolution through the agency of relatives 
2. Resolution through the agency of prominent individuals in the village 
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3. Village-level resolution through the agency of the panchayat or village assembly(either 
traditional or elected) 
4. Resolution through the forces of law & order (courts and police).   
 
Figure 4: Conflict Resolution Rate (%) by Resolving Agent, Type of Conflict, and 
Time Period* 
*Percentage of Resolved Conflicts by Resolving Agent 
Figure 4 shows that the share of the different agents in the number of resolved conflicts did not 
change much over time: for example, in each period, about 40% of caste-based conflicts were 
resolved by the panchayat.  There were, however, significant differences in agent shares between 
caste and non-caste conflicts. Most notably, the police and the courts were relatively more important - 
and prominent individuals in the village were relatively less important - in resolving caste-based 
conflicts, compared to non-caste-based conflicts.  This raises the further question of whether the 
probability of a particular agency resolving a conflict depended not just upon the nature of the conflict 
(caste versus non-caste), but also upon inter alia the household’s caste group and level of education. 
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5.  Estimation Results: Caste-Based Conflict 
 In this section we estimate an econometric model, based on a probit regression, in which the 
dependent variable, y, took the value 1 if household i, i=1,…,N, observed a conflict which it judged to 
be caste-based  (that is, its answers to the questions in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 were both ‘yes’) 
and zero if it was involved in a conflict which it judged to be non-caste-based (that is, its answers to 
the questions in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 were, respectively ‘yes’ and ‘no’). In essence, therefore, 
the probit model estimates the probability that a conflict, observed by a household, would be judged 
by it to be caste-based, conditional on the values of a number of factors set out below:12 
1. The source of the conflict. In this context, we consider four sources – labour, drinking 
water, inter-family, and politics – since, as observed in section 3 these sources 
comprised over 80% of caste related conflicts. 
2. The time period of the conflict. In this context, we consider two time periods: the 
period of the current panchayat and the period of the previous panchayat. Thus, we 
drop observations relating to the previous to previous panchayat because of the 
difficulty recalling, with any accuracy, events which occurred nearly 15 years ago. 
3. The caste group to which the household belonged: Scheduled Castes (SC), Other 
Backward Classes (OBC), and Upper Castes (UC). 
4. The household’s characteristics. For the sake of parsimony, we take this as the 
educational level of the household head.  These levels were: (i) illiterate; (ii) educated 
up to primary level; (iii) educated up to secondary level; (iv) educated up to higher 
secondary level or uncompleted college; (v) educated with a degree or higher.   
Interaction effects were used to model whether the effect of one conditioning variable varied 
according to values of another variable.  In the context of this study, a natural question to ask is 
whether the effect of the conditioning variables (source of conflict, household social group, and 
household education) on the likelihood of observing a caste-based conflict varied according to time 
 
12
 In addition, there were controls for the states (there were 17 states covered by REDS) which took the form of 
categorical variables which took the value 1 if the respondent was from a particular state, 0 if he was he/she was 
not.  Similarly, there were 241 villages in REDS and village fixed effects were captured  by means of 
categorical variables which took the value 1 if the respondent was from a particular village, 0 if he was he/she 
was not.  These fixed effects are not reported. 
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period.  In order to answer this question we estimated a general model, on data for 21,593 household 
observations of conflicts that had occurred in their respective villages, in which the conflict source, 
social group, and education variables were allowed to interact with the current and previous time 
periods. 
Probit (and logit) models are examples of generalised linear models such that, if y is the 
dependent variable which takes 1,0 values, and x1…xK are K co-variates, and u is an error term then: 
 0 1 1( ) ... KF y x x uβ β β= + + +   (1) 
 In a logit model, the error term is assumed to follow a logistic distribution so that 
Pr( 1)( )
1 Pr( 1)
yF y
y
 ==  − = 
   where Pr(y=1) is the probability that y takes the value 1.  In a probit model, 
the error term is assumed to follow a normal distribution so that F(y)= 1−Φ [Pr(y=1)], where 1−Φ is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution. This implies that Pr((y=1)= Φ ( 0 1 1... Kx xβ β β+ + ).  In 
practice, there is little difference between the estimates obtained from logit and probit methods since 
the logistic and normal distributions are very similar. 
Following the advice contained in Long and Freese (2014), the results from the estimated 
equation are presented in Table 3 in the form of the predicted probabilities from the estimated probit 
coefficients and not in terms of the estimates themselves.  This is because the probit estimates 
themselves do not have a natural interpretation – they exist mainly as a basis for computing more 
meaningful statistics and, in this case, these are the predicted probabilities. Using these results we 
examined whether the average likelihood of conflicts, in which households were ‘involved’, being 
caste-based had changed significantly between the two periods.    
The results from the estimated probit model (Table 6) show that, given that a conflict has 
been observed, the average probability - computed over all 21,593 household observations - of it 
being caste-based was 16.3 % in the present period (column 2) and 14.6% in the previous period 
(column 3).13. Dividing the difference in these probabilities (shown in column 4) by the standard error 
 
13
 This prediction was based upon using the equation estimates, in conjunction with the observed values of the 
conditioning variables, to compute Pr[yi=1] for each household  in the present and past periods and then to 
average over these predicted probabilities to obtain for, respectively, the present and past periods, the 
probability of observing a caste-based conflict as 16.3% and 14.6% 
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of the difference (column 5) yields the z value (column 6) for testing the null hypothesis that the two 
probabilities are the equal (that is, the difference is zero).  The z-value of 3.83 rejects this hypothesis 
and the p-value in column 7 confirms this.  Consequently, one can infer that the average probability of 
an observed conflict being caste-based conflict was significantly greater in the present, than in the 
past, period.  
The results in Table 6 also allow comparisons to be made between the present and the past 
for: caste groups, sources of conflict, and educational levels.  The likelihood for SC and OBC 
households of observed conflicts being caste-based went up from 15.5% and 14.1%, respectively, in 
the past period to 17.6% and 16.3%, respectively, in the present period. Both rises (of, respectively, 
2.1 and 2.2 percentage points) were significantly different from zero. Similarly the likelihood of 
observed conflicts, that are sourced by sharing drinking water and inter-family disputes, being caste-
based went up from 15.4% and 12.5% , respectively, in the past period to 19% and 13.7%, 
respectively, in the present period. Both rises (of, respectively, 3.6 and 1.2 percentage points) were 
significantly different from zero. In terms of education, the likelihood of educated (secondary 
education and above) households observing conflicts that were caste-based went up, for example for 
graduates, from 13.9% in the past period to 19.3% in the present period. This rise of 5.4 percentage 
points was significantly different from zero. 
Table 6: Comparing the Probability of Caste Based Conflicts between Past and Present 
Panchayat Periods: 21,593 conflicts* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conditioning 
Variable 
Probability 
(Current) 
Probability (Past) Difference SE of 
Difference 
z value for H0: 
Pr(current) = 
Pr(past) 
Pr>|z| 
Overall 0.163 0.146 0.016 0.004 3.83 0.00 
Caste Group       
Scheduled Caste 
(SC) 0.176 0.155 0.021 0.010 2.02 0.04 
Other Backward 
Classes (OBC) 0.163 0.141 0.022 0.006 3.68 0.00 
Upper Castes (UC)  0.154 0.150 0.005 0.008 0.65 0.51 
Source of Conflict       
Labour  0.159 0.149 0.010 0.012 0.81 0.42 
Drinking Water 0.190 0.154 0.036 0.010 3.73 0.00 
Inter-Family 0.137 0.125 0.012 0.006 1.94 0.05 
Political 0.190 0.181 0.010 0.010 1.00 0.32 
Education       
Illiterate 0.157 0.141 0.016 0.007 2.38 0.02 
Primary 0.164 0.168 -0.004 0.009 -0.47 0.63 
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Secondary 0.155 0.135 0.020 0.009 2.20 0.03 
Higher Secondary 0.184 0.143 0.042 0.014 3.07 0.00 
Graduate or above 0.193 0.139 0.054 0.020 2.66 0.01 
*Which households observed 
 
6.  The Rise of Caste-Based Conflict in India 
 The previous section showed very clearly that there was a rise in caste-based conflict over the 
(approximate) period 1996-2006. This begs the question of why this rise occurred.  There are several 
reasons for the rise in caste-based conflict over the past two decades. 
The first is the rise in assertiveness of persons belonging to India’s lower castes who are less 
prepared to accept the subservient role that upper caste Hindus expect of them.  In turn, this has 
generated resentment from upper-caste persons as they see traditional social relations, underpinned by 
lower-caste subservience, being eroded.  The conjunction of lower caste demand for greater equality 
and upper caste reluctance to acquiesce to such demands then leads to conflict. 
Chakraborty et. al. (2006) showed that anti-Dalit crimes were most frequent in areas 
characterised by upward mobility among Dalits. Their evidence suggests that violence is directed at 
relatively better off Dalits and, to that extent, atrocities are a response of upper-caste Hindu society to 
Dalit mobility. Not only are anti-Dalit crimes directed at better off Dalits, but they tend to be most 
frequent in districts in which the proportion of Dalits in the population is higher than the national 
average (16.2%).    
The EPW (2014) notes, rising caste conflict is part of “a growing trend wherein Dalit youth, 
particularly those who are educated and ignore ‘their place’ in the social hierarchy by attempting to 
interact with women from the so called higher castes, are targeted with incredible cruelty”.14  Several 
so called inter-family conflicts have been triggered by inter-caste marriages between Dalit men and 
upper caste women. The Hindustan Times reported on15 April 2013 that “agitated after the recent 
elopement and marriage of a Dalit man with a woman from the landowning Ror community of the 
 
14
 In other states, particularly Bihar and Jharkhand, Dalit assertiveness is conflated with Maoist (known in India 
as ‘Naxalites’) armed activity against the established ruling classes.  The response from the latter is to form 
private armies (most prominently, the Bhoomi Sena and the Ranvir Sena) to attack Dalits on the pretext that 
their assertiveness is simply a camouflage for Naxailte activity. These private armies were aided by the state 
governments through being issued with licences for arms and ammunition (Sushmita, 2014). 
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same village, a 400-strong mob barged into the [Dalit] settlement and not only ransacked houses and 
shops but also damaged the locality's water tanks and six bore-wells, besides injuring three 
persons.”15  The India Today newspaper reported that following the marriage of a Dalit boy and an 
upper caste girl in the state of Tamil Nadu, a mob of over 1,500 people entered the Dalit Colony on 7 
November 2012 and ransacked houses making 300 families homeless.16  
 Many of these sources of violence have to do with the growing confidence of the lower castes 
in (a) their willingness to see upper caste women as potential spouses, a willingness that might have 
been unthinkable a few decades ago and (ii) their refusal to be routinely humiliated in the use of 
public goods, humiliations that they might have accepted without question in the past.  And, to a great 
extent, the growing assertiveness of the lower castes has come with the realisation that, in a 
democracy, their numbers give them political clout. 
 In the last 20 years Indian politics has changed in important ways. Perhaps the most dramatic 
has been the fragmentation of politics as the lower castes have left the Congress party’s upper-caste 
dominated ‘big tent’ to set up their own parties in opposition to the Congress. As Jodhka (2012) 
observes, there is a weakening of traditional caste relations based on status and hierarchy and this has 
been facilitated by India’s lower classes rising to challenge, at the ballot box, the traditional political 
hegemony of India’s upper castes. 
Jaffrelot (2003) has examined India’s “silent revolution” through which lower-status groups 
have increasingly captured political office and used political power to alter the balance of power 
between the upper and the lower castes in the countryside.  Foremost among these lower caste groups 
– who originally were mobilised by the upper caste Congress Party but who now mobilised 
themselves against the Congress – were the OBC. These were castes that were not forward – in the 
sense of belonging to the Brahmin, Kshatriya, or Vaishya varnas – but who, unlike the SC, were not 
considered ‘untouchable’.  In the context of Indian politics, the OBC is a useful electoral category 
 
15
 http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/dalit-locality-attacked-water-supply-cut-after-inter-caste-
marriage-in-haryana/article1-1044879.aspx (accessed 21 July 2015). 
16
 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/inter-caste-marriage-violence-tamil-nadu-vanniers-dalits/1/234837.html 
(accessed 21 July 2015). 
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encapsulating the lower castes above the pollution line who have tried, by voting along caste lines, to 
carve out a political space for themselves. 
 Next to follow were castes that were below the pollution line and their chosen political 
vehicle was the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) which is led by a Dalit woman, Mayawati who has been 
four times Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh – India’s largest and most populous states.  In this state 
power has alternated between the Samajwadi Party (whose support is anchored among the Other 
Backward Classes and Muslims) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (whose support is anchored among the 
SC).  As a general rule, whenever one party forms the government in Uttar Pradesh, groups supporting 
the other party lose out. 
In this political see-saw both lower caste groups have benefited from political favours. 
Favours to one’s supporters took essentially two forms: the provision of local public goods targeted at 
particular groups, say a paved road or a school in a locality in which people from a group were 
concentrated; the provision of private benefits to targeted groups of (usually poor) voters, often in the 
form of cash payments or gifts in kind like cycles, sewing machines, and illegally supplying below 
poverty line (BPL) cards to voters who do not qualify for these (Breeding, 2011). The general 
phenomenon underlying these developments has been the rise of caste-based parties who come to 
power by drawing on the votes of the (lower) castes supporting them (Chandra, 2004). 
7. Estimation Results: Conflict Resolution 
 The discussion of conflict resolution in section 4 raised the question of whether the 
probability of a particular agency resolving a conflict depended not just upon the nature of the conflict 
(caste versus non-caste), but also upon inter alia the household’s caste group and level of education. 
This section answers this question by estimating an ordered logit model in which the dependent 
variable took the values: 1, if the conflict was resolved through relatives; 2, if the resolving agency 
was prominent individuals; 3, if the panchayat was the resolving agency; and 4, if the conflict was 
resolved by the police and/or law courts.17  
 
17
 The logic of the ordering was persons who were relatives; persons who were not relatives; elected institutions; 
non-elected institutions with the power of coercion. 
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The ordered logit model was estimated conditional on the values of a number of conditioning 
factors set out at the beginning of section 5, namely, the source of the conflict; household caste group, 
and household education level. Interaction effects were used to model whether the effects of the 
conditioning variables (conflict source, household social group, and household education) on the 
likelihood of resolving a conflict, through a particular agency, varied according to whether it was a 
caste-based or a non-caste-based conflict.  In order to answer this question we estimated a general 
model in which the conditioning variables were allowed to interact with a variable which took the 
value 1 if a conflict was caste-based, 0 if it was not.      
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Table 7: Probabilities of Households Using Different Types of Agents to Resolve Conflicts: 
21,483 Resolved Conflicts 
1 2 3  4 5 6 
Conflict Resolved 
by: 
Probability 
(Caste-
Based) 
Probability 
(non-Caste 
Based) 
Difference SE of 
Difference 
z value for 
H0: 
Pr(caste) = 
Pr(non-
caste) 
Pr>|z| 
Relatives 0.158 0.213 -0.056 0.007 -7.580 0.00 
Individuals 0.378 0.389 -0.012 0.004 -2.810 0.01 
Panchayat 0.305 0.264 0.042 0.028 1.500 0.13 
Courts & Police 0.159 0.134 0.026 0.007 3.740 0.00 
 
Table 7 shows the probabilities that caste-based and non-caste based conflicts were resolved 
by each of the four agents:  relatives, individuals, panchayats, and courts and police. So, Table 7 
shows that, for caste-based [non-caste-based] conflicts, 15.8% [21.3%] were resolved by relatives, 
37.8% [38.9%] by individuals, 30.5% [26.4%] by panchayats, and 15.9% 13.4%] by the courts and 
police.18   
The most important finding in Table 7 is the importance of panchayats and prominent 
individuals in resolving village conflicts: 69% of caste-based, and 65% of non-caste based, conflicts 
were resolved by one or the other of these two agents.  The second finding of note is that panchayats 
played a significantly larger role in resolving caste-based, compared to non-caste based conflicts 
while relatives played a significantly larger role in resolving non-caste-based, compared to caste-
based conflicts. There was, thus a clear divide between caste-based and non-caste based conflicts in 
terms of the agency used to resolve conflicts: the latter relied on relatives and the panchayats while 
the former relied on individuals and the law. 
 8.  Conclusions 
Although caste-based conflict has been presented in the literature as between upper castes and 
the SC it could also be between the (non-SC) backward classes and the SC or between the upper castes 
and the (non-SC) backward classes.  Competition for land and reserved places in educational 
institutions and jobs mean that the non-SC backward classes and the SC often clash; the rise of India’s 
lower castes (Jaffrelot, 2003) has meant that conflict between India’s upper and lower castes is on the 
 
18
 Note that the probabilities sum to 1 over the rows in the second and third columns.  
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increase. Furthermore, compared to non-caste-based conflicts, caste-based conflicts entail greater loss 
of life and property and, as we have shown, they require the services of different agencies for their 
resolution. 
The question is whether caste-based conflicts will become a permanent feature of life in rural 
India. According to one of India’s towering intellects and greatest leaders, Bhim Rao (B.R.) 
Ambedkar (1891-1956), the caste system was a system by which some groups of persons, using the 
justification of religion practice and belief, exploited for economic ends, other groups of persons.  
Religious sanctity was used to restrict occupational choice, access to learning, access to places of 
worship, access to public spaces and public goods, and to extract cheap labour to perform 
menial/dirty/ dangerous jobs.  In Ambedkar’s own words: “The centre of the ideal [of Hinduism] is 
neither individual nor society. It is a class; it is a class of supermen called Brahmins; anything which 
serves the interests of this class is, alone, entitled to be called good” (Ambedkar, 1987, p. 72). In 
serving this class of ‘supermen’, he adds: “The Hindus are the only people in the world whose 
economic order – the relation of workman to workman – is consecrated by religion and made sacred, 
eternal, and inviolate” (Ambedkar, 1987, p. 129). 
Ambedkar drew attention to the appalling denial of civil, social, and economic rights to 
untouchables and demanded ‘citizenship rights’ for untouchables accompanied by legal safeguards 
against the violation of rights and policies for empowering untouchables by compensating them for 
the historical abuse of their rights (Thorat and Kumar, 2008). Today these views have culminated in, 
firstly, a substantial number of SC persons leaving Hinduism to become Buddhists and secondly, 
efforts by the Indian government to correct historical wrongs by a policy of reserving places in 
education, employment, and legislatures. 
However, ‘reservation policies’ have exacerbated tensions between those included in, and 
those left out from, the reservation net; more unexpectedly, tensions have grown between those who 
were the original beneficiaries of the reservation policy (the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes) and those who, under the terms of the 1980 Mandal Commission’s Report, were recent 
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beneficiaries (the OBC).  So much so, that it may be claimed, without too much exaggeration, that 
today the sharpest animosities, and the keenest rivalries, in India exist between the OBC and SC.     
Groups which live on the margins of Indian society – Muslims, the Scheduled Castes, and the 
Scheduled Tribes – face three kinds of difficulty.  First, in the context of the market they face issues 
of access (for example, not being to obtain jobs or housing) or disparity (for example, having to 
accept lower wages or only being offered certain kinds of jobs or housing).  This then leads to the 
general problem of a lack of representation of certain groups in important areas of economic/political 
activity. Second, in the context of common property resources, they face the problem of dominant 
groups ‘privatising’ these resources through violence and converting them into resources over which 
they exercise ‘ownership’ and control (for example, in terms of access to common property resources 
like water and forests). Consequently, marginalised groups are bullied and intimidated into having to 
wait their turn to use common property resources. Thirdly, public policy initiatives which are meant to 
confer universal benefits are ‘captured’ by dominant groups – often acting in concert with those 
responsible for delivering these schemes – who then cream off most of the benefits. 
Looking into the future, therefore, the social inclusion of marginalised groups depends upon 
redressing all the above three problems. The Hindu social order needs reform. This reformation  might 
preserve the caste system but it must sweep away the concept and practice of untouchability and with 
it the attendant notion that certain occupations are so ‘unclean’ that they pollute not only those who 
work in these but also their progeny. Instead, Hindus should embrace the idea that all persons are 
equal before the law. Otherwise, the growing assertiveness of the lower castes will always cause them 
to ask - in the words of Shylock in The Merchant of Venice – “and if you wrong us, shall we not 
revenge?” 
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Appendix 
Probit Estimates from which the results of Table 6 were derived 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
z-value 
Source of Conflict    
Labour  0.031 0.065 0.5 
Drinking Water -0.149 0.060 -2.5 
Inter-Family 0.172 0.063 2.7 
Political [R]    
Period 
   
Current 0.192 0.131 1.5 
Past [R] 
   
Interaction: Source × Current    
Labour 0.133 0.085 1.6 
Drinking Water 0.020 0.078 0.3 
Inter-Family -0.006 0.084 -0.1 
Caste Group 
   
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.030 0.056 0.5 
Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) 
-0.049 0.047 -1.1 
Upper Castes (UC) [R]    
Interaction: Group × Current 
   
Scheduled Caste 0.085 0.071 1.2 
Other Backward Classes 0.098 0.055 1.8 
Education 
   
Illiterate 0.015 0.090 0.2 
Primary 0.164 0.093 1.8 
Secondary -0.024 0.094 -0.3 
Higher Secondary 0.022 0.100 0.2 
Graduate or above [R] 
   
Interaction: Education × 
Current 
   
Illiterate -0.203 0.118 -1.7 
Primary -0.317 0.122 -2.6 
Secondary -0.176 0.123 -1.4 
Higher Secondary -0.067 0.133 -0.5 
Number of observations = 21,593;  LR chi2(199) = 4812.08 
Log likelihood = -6913.6193; Pseudo R2 = 0.2582 
[R] denotes reference category 
 
